In Buffalo, 47 Died in a Blizzard Because Government Failed Them.
New York's executive managers failed in their most basic obligations
Snow blankets the street, sidewalks and cars as an eerie hush falls over Laurel Street in Buffalo, New York, as seen at about 11:30 on Christmas Eve morning, the second day of a three-day blizzard. Photo Credit: Andre Carrotflower via Wikimedia Commons.
By J.G. Collins
There is no higher priority of a government than protecting the health and safety of its citizens.
On that basic responsibility, western New York's leaders, and particularly Governor Kathy Hochul (D-N.Y.), failed miserably in the winter storm that paralyzed the region over the Christmas holiday. At least 47 people are now dead, with at least three others reportedly awaiting cause of death determinations from the county medical examiner.
While people are ultimately responsible for their own safety and following weather warnings, and people invariably die in severe winter storms, the authorities responsible for managing the preparation and response to the storm failed. These include the governor, County Executive Mark Poloncarz (D-Erie County), and Buffalo Mayor Byron Brown (D).
Region Historically Beset by Winter Storms
Incapacitating, devastating storms are occasional hazards of life in western New York. A hard storm struck the region in November, just weeks before the December blizzard. There was another devastating storm just eight years ago, in 2014, in which 13 people died. That one came with so little warning that then-Governor Andrew Cuomo called for a state-run weather service to supersede the National Weather Service.
Before that, in 1985, a threatened blizzard accumulated only 3 feet of snow, but 55mph winds dropped temperatures to -10°F the weekend of the Superbowl. Buffalonians followed the wise (and since legendary) advice of then-Mayor Jimmy Griffin to "Stay home, enjoy your family, and grab a six-pack." It is now known as "The Six-pack Storm".
As a native of the region, I remember living through the Blizzard of 1977, one of the worst in living memory before 2022. It was debilitating, but authorities of the time were apparently better prepared. That disaster claimed 27 lives, but that was in an era before cell phones, and social media allowed people to reach out to authorities and neighbors for help from their stranded cars and homes. If one were to compare the 1977 storm and the 2022 storm, one would think the Blizzard of '22 should have had far fewer deaths. Instead, reported deaths as of this writing are 44 souls, with the Erie County Medical Center reportedly checking for the cause of death on more.
Clearly then, while this storm may have been generational, it was not a unique phenomenon, given the region's history. And it is one for which government managers should have been better prepared.
Inadequate Storm Response
The warnings of a severe storm were early, from at least Monday, the 19th, and they were consistent and increasingly threatening. And this time, the National Weather Service prognostications were deadly accurate.
Let's critique the official response from a managerial perspective:
1. The governor appears to have been distracted and underestimated the storm.
Lake Erie had not frozen over at the outset of the storm. Traditionally, that has left western New York particularly vulnerable to "lake effect" blizzards. Given the predicted severity of the storm, this should have triggered "hair-on-fire" warnings at the county and state levels.
How lake effect snow accumulates. (National Weather Service)
But with warnings of a severe storm looming, the governor, a Buffalo-area native, chose to remain in Albany as late as the Thursday before the storm. This cannot be confirmed at this time because the governor's schedule has not yet been released. But an unrelated Executive Order says she executed it in Albany on Friday, Dec. 23, the day the storm hit with a vengeance. She was reported to be in Albany for a special session where Democrat legislators were voting for a $32,000— 29 percent—raise for themselves to make them the highest-paid state legislators in the country. Yet another report placed the governor in Queens on Saturday, Christmas Eve, discussing coastal flooding in that area.
Kathryn Garcia, the State Director of Operations and the state executive who is charged with "making the trains run on time", was also in Queens, according to the same report. So the two people who could have been most effective in quarterbacking the state's storm response were both in Queens, far away from western New York.
A tweet from the governor herself discussing her "approach to Buffalo" at 2:43 PM Sunday afternoon, Christmas Day, Dec. 25, seems to indicate she did not arrive in Buffalo until then, well after the storm had devastated the region.
2. The governor failed to pre-deploy sufficient rescue and snow removal assets
A statement from the governor, which is undated and has no time stamp, but that was posted on Friday, Dec. 23, on her website (a French language version confirms that date), shows that she deployed only 54 New York National Guardsmen on that day.
In a press conference called at 5:00PM Sunday, December 25th, Governor Hochul defended her preparation, and was quoted by WHAM, Channel 13, as saying,
National Guard takes a little bit of time to call up you don't just click your fingers. But also, we knew we had to get the plows and the plow drivers in first, so that was our first priority. The National Guard comes in to help when local governments aren't able to accomplish their jobs. You don't bring them in every minute, you bring them in to support the local recovery efforts.”
It was apparently lost on the governor that the whole point of pre-deploying National Guard and other resources ahead of the storm is to have them in place ahead of the storm "because once the snow starts, you couldn't even see." But having them pre-deployed allows more rapid response once visibility returns.
In a statement dated December 25, Governor Hochul's various departments were described as responding the western New York with the following assets (excluding the personnel):
From the Department of Transportation:
10 plow trucks,
3 snow blowers
1 grader
1 bull dozer
4 contract loaders
Other state assets were listed and several other assets were deployed to the North Country (Watertown, St. Lawrence, etc.), the area east of Lake Ontario that also suffered power outages from the storm.
But in a subsequent report , dated December 30th, Hochul Administration officials reportedly claimed that dozens of other state assets, "including 75 plow trucks, 20 large bucket loaders, 18 snowmobiles, five tow plows and eight generators" had been deployed before the storm hit on December 23rd. But there is no mention of those assets in the December 25th contemporaneous statement.
Melissa DeRosa, Secretary (effectively, a chief of staff) to former Governor Andrew Cuomo, has been particularly critical of the Hochul Administration. Notably, since Hochul was Cuomo's lieutenant governor, one would assume DeRosa might be more reserved in her opinion of her former boss' second-in-command. But the Buffalo News quoted her in a blistering critique. DeRosa said, among other criticisms, that snowmobile assets from the Department of Environmental Conservation rescue teams could have been deployed,
"They sort of botched the road closures... And once that happened (you could have) had trained professionals that could go and help in search and rescue. Instead, you had a situation where your government leaders are pleading with civilians to do that job."
DeRosa also criticized Governor Hochul's management skills:
"When we were in office we did not leave [emergency response] decisions to the locals. When there was a major crisis or event, the governor would come in and take responsibility and ownership of the entire situation. In this instance, what was missing was a quarterback. There was nobody in charge. There was no one calling the shots."
Presumably, “there was nobody in charge” because the two people in New York State would could best effect a powerful state response - Kathy Hochul and Catherine Garcia, her director of operations - were in Queens as the storm raged.
3. The governor failed to exercise her plenipotentiary police powers in a timely and effective manner.
The storm struck Buffalo at approximately 10:00AM. But according to the Washington Post,
"Shortly before 9 a.m. ... [Mark]Poloncarz [the Erie County Executive] instituted a travel ban starting at 9:30 a.m. — right after the morning rush. By then, many people were already out on the roads, or didn’t know the ban even existed."
USA Today reported that
"Wind gusts moving as fast as 79 mph were recorded in the area six minutes after the county travel ban took effect. By then, thousands of people had already lost power."
With the storm looming, the governor should have issued an executive order before 4:00PM Thursday, December 22nd, to get news coverage. The order should have closed businesses and banned travel at 6:00AM the following morning, Friday, December 23rd. That would have been politically difficult, given last minute Christmas shopping and travel plans, but it was critical to public safety. Governors are paid to make those kinds of difficult decisions.
Instead, a state of emergency was issued at 7:00AM on Friday morning, but it came only with a "travel advisory", not the outright ban that came two and a half hours later, after the storm was already hitting the area. As media reports confirm, thousands of workers were likely already at work and many had gone to work for their Friday pay day, particularly those in lower-wage retail and restaurant jobs where many workers live paycheck-to-paycheck and some are still paid in cash.
Additionally, in preparation for the storm, critical road infrastructure -- things like major thoroughfares necessary to deploy snow removal and emergency equipment assets and access roads to hospitals, fire houses, and police stations -- should have been closed to all but emergency traffic and policed with tow-trucks well before the storm hit to avoid cars blocking the roadways. Road closures commencing at 12:00 midnight on Thursday, December 23rd, would have prevented many of the vehicle blockages of critical roadways prior to the storm. As soon as visibility allowed, snow clearing assets could have been rapidly deployed to enable emergency equipment to pass without being blocked by civilian vehicles stuck in the snow.
As in areas hit by hurricanes, Erie County should have designated residential streets that are routes for emergency vehicles that must be cleared of all parking prior to the storm. Residential and commercial streets housing firehouses, ambulance corps, or police stations should have been totally bereft of street parking at the declaration of a snow emergency.
4, The county, the state, and the New York National Guard have insufficient resources, and an insufficient plan, to deal with Buffalo's recurring severe winter storm conditions.
The Washington Post story linked above describes a 10 percent shortage of paramedics and EMTs that it ascribes to "burnout and low wages". (It makes no mention of the draconian "vaccinate or else" measures imposed from Albany that might possibly have also affected the emergency health responder workforce.)
DeRosa's critique pointed out that in anticipation of the 2014 storm, then-Governor Cuomo called up 400 New York National Guardsmen whereas Governor Hochul called up only 54, and only well after the storm had started.
But well beyond the staffing, there was a critical shortfall in snow removal and rescue equipment in all areas of government.
While the snowstorm was blinding for up to 36 hours, having the equipment necessary to effect rescues ready and pre-positioned might have saved many of those lost. Equipping various county and city rescue and police vehicles with snowmobiles and detachable Mattracks or Track n' Go traction drives, akin to the traction drives used on tanks, in anticipation of the storm, might have have allowed ready deployment of rescue assets immediately after the blinding winds had subsided. The same goes for some of the utility repair trucks that were deployed, but that could not reach the sites of necessary repairs because snow blocked their path.
The New York National Guard does not appear to be equipped or trained as Vehicle Recovery Teams. These teams of combat engineers, consisting of eight guardsmen working in two shifts, are deployed in massive, large-tire, M984 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks and a trailing Humvee. They are tasked to remove stalled or stuck vehicles. They did so in a storm in South Carolina.
S.C. Army National Guardsmen equipped with an M984 Recovery Truck (Wrecker), a 10-ton heavy-duty wrecker designed to perform in extreme circumstances and capable of maneuvering in any type of terrain including water, snow or mud, respond when Gov. Nikki Haley declares a state of emergency by positioning crews at strategic locations throughout the state in response to Winter Storm Leon. Members of the 1118th Forward Support Company (FSC) responded overnight by pulling an overturned 18-wheeler on I-95 southbound that had flipped over on its side. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. Brian Calhoun/Released)
SOME THOUGHTS ON A BETTER RESPONSE
The hackneyed cliché is, "failing to plan is planning to fail". But it is most appropriate here as applied to Kathy Hochul, Erie County Executive Mark Poloncarz, and Buffalo Mayor Byron Brown.
Everyone recognizes the difficulty (and the expense) or deploying a unionized state workforce just days before Christmas and requiring them to work through the holiday. But New York pays its workforce well, and is enormously generous with health and retirement benefits. Being called to serve over a holiday in a civil emergency goes with the job.
But Governor Hochul's exhortation to the media that this was a "historic storm", a description parroted by the media, seems more an effort to ameliorate her failure to plan for it than an honest assessment of the region's weather, as related above. This storm was certainly bad, easily the worst in a generation, and exacerbated by single-digit temperatures and sustained and gusting hurricane-force winds.
That said, though, heavy winter storms and high winds producing blinding, drifting snow are not an unusual occurrence for the region. Preparations should have been made, not just in the week of severe storm warnings from the NWS, but in the years ahead. Among the things that Erie County (the hardest hit) and state could have done to ameliorate the tragic effects of the storm were:
Having hospitals call in at least two shifts, with their suitcases, prior to the declaration of a snow emergency to care for patients. Hospitals could be equipped with cots to be set up in hallways, conference rooms, cafeterias, empty wards, and other spaces. News reports were that healthcare workers were stuck in hospitals for days with no relief. A local snowmobile club had to get nurses to their shifts.
Evaluating whether city, state, national guard vehicles could use Mattracks and Track n' Go attachments to restore emergency snow transportation. While such equipment might struggle in very deep powdery, snow, or over steep inclines, as shown in this video, they may do better in the heavier, denser, packable, lake effect snow that tends to afflict western New York. They would also be ready to move sooner on partially plowed, snow-covered, roads than vehicles with tires and chains. Snow mobile teams could be deployed for immediate aid.
Employing an emergency street closure and car clearance plan for critical thoroughfares at the declaration of an emergency so they can be properly plowed at the earliest opportunity. Sufficient resources should be provided to ensure principal roadways in and around Buffalo should be cleared and passable within 6 hours of the end of the storm.
Amending the New York Mental Hygiene Law to declare any individual who refuses to take shelter in a storm emergency or when temperatures will be sustained below 32 degrees, is, prima facie, a danger to themselves and thus mentally ill. This will allow authorities to arrest and involuntary commit such people for the duration of the storm or until they are cleared by a psychiatrist, whichever comes later.
Training and equipping a battalion (about 1,000 troops) of the New York National Guard at the Northern Warfare Training Center so that it can supply a purpose-driven Guard unit for winter storm response and service. The battalion should be comprised of local soldiers from the eight counties of western New York and be able to be deployed on 12 hours notice of a storm warning. Armory space should be maintained for the battalion in the region. A few company-sized units should be deployed to the North Country, the Southern Tier, and Long Island to assist with storms in those areas, too.
Buried utility lines. This is something that should have been done 45 years ago, after the Blizzard of 1977. Yes, it will be a costly and disruptive, but given that these storms are recurring sporadically, they present an existential risk to life and property in western New York. The state should mandate buried utility lines in Erie, Niagara, Orleans, Genesee, Wyoming, Chautauqua and Cattaraugus Counties by 2035. With New Yorkers leading the Senate majority and the House minority in Washington, and $1.7 trillion spent in the Omnibus bill passed in the 117th Congress, a tranche of funding for 2023 for the first of these trenches should be been an easy ask in the 118th Congress. It was not among the $425 million in New York State earmarks in the Omnibus Bill passed last month.
A regional, voluntary, listing of individuals with critical care needs for whom a loss of electricity could be life-threatening or who require home care aides who could not reach them in a storm. These individuals could be triaged for welfare checks and given more ready assistance as required.
Avoiding street parking on critical roadways. Residents who park their vehicles on residential or commercial streets that are necessary for access to fire houses, police stations, hospitals and ambulance corps should be given a location to move their vehicle in advance of the declaration of a snow emergency. Some may wish to park on their own lawns, but those on critical streets should be advised of parks or commercial parking lots where they can move their vehicles on a storm warning. School buses could be used to return residents to their homes after moving them and to their cars after the storm has subsided and their streets are plowed. Cars that aren't removed should be towed to their designated location.
Helicopter rescue teams. Once the storm had cleared, National Guard helicopter rescue teams could be deployed to highways to find stranded vehicles. Infrared camera technology that is being developed in Canada would hopefully significantly improve the ability to rescue those lost in snow because it targeted to "find avalanche victims or vehicles caught in a snowstorm."
A state university program offering associate, bachelor's, and masters degrees in disaster response. Western New York's storm conditions aren't going to go away. It's important to have a skilled, trained, and educated civilian body of emergency response planners and first responders who can manage these intermittent life-threatening crises. Many of those skills are transferable to other disasters, as well. Emergency preparation and response for North Country blizzards, Long Island Nor’easters and New York City terror attacks in could all benefit. And having expert faculty to train uniformed first responders and elected officials in seminars could only ameliorate the public’s suffering.
CONCLUSIONS
This storm was certainly bad, one of the region's worst, and exasperated by single-digit temperatures and sustained and gusting hurricane-force winds. But even winter storms and winds that are generational should not be considered atypical for the region; they recur from time-to-time. Preparations should have been made, not just in the week of severe storm warnings from the NWS, but in the years ahead of it.
New York has ordered a review of its response by the Wagner School of Public Service at New York University. But while Wagner is an excellent school, it is intended to train leaders for public service in the bureaucracy and not-for-profits. It's not a school that specializes in practical emergency response and first-responder training like, say, Georgetown. (I could find only one course each in Emergency Management and Logistics in the Wagner catalog.)
New York Senate Minority Leader Rob Ortt (R, C - Lockport) and Senator Patrick Gallivan (R, C - Elma) have called on their Democrat colleagues on various committees "to conduct oversight hearings to assess the state’s response". But this is only a request; with Democrats controlling both Albany Capitol chambers, the two western New York Senators request for hearings would be at the pleasure of the majority party.
But what is actually needed is a robust, independent, multi-disciplinary, review by an independent, expert, panel with experience in disaster planning and response, logistics, meteorology, and National Guard rescue and recovery capabilities.
A government that fails to take account of consistent, albeit infrequent, dangerous environmental conditions and hazards of its populace, and to protect them adequately, has failed in its most fundamental reason for being.
New Yorkers should hold it to account.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: We reached out to Governor Hochul's press office with respect to this column. It did not respond to our request for comment.
Emergency Management is a very specialized discipline. In most cases emergencies are handled by local emergency management agencies like the counties and cities. But at times when a larger response is called for, State and even Federal intervention is called for to coordinate multi jurisdictional responses. This is where the system failed in this case. Where was FEMA and/or the State Emergency Management Agency. I’ll tell you - AWOL.